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Scholars have often commented on the inherent complexity of federal government
and on the diversities within the American system. It is like a Jacob's coat, with the
peculiarity being not its many colors but its many patterns and additionally the
continuous laying of new patterns over the old. Banking provided the setting for
some of the early developments in our creative federalism,' and the arrangements
for regulating banking functions since 1863 reveal peculiarities and incremental
modifications in a pattern of federal-state relationships.
The peculiarities in the pattern arise from what is commonly called the "dual
banking system." In a narrow sense dual banking is simply banking under two
charter systems, one national and the other state, with accompanying supervision by
the chartering jurisdiction. In a broader sense, however, it encompasses all the
arrangements under which national and state banks are enabled to live side by side
in a comprehensive system of banking regulation imposed by national and state
authorities3 In this broader sense, six features characterize the present-day dual
banking system and form a distinctive pattern in American federalism.
First, an industry of national importance and one affecting interstate commerce
is a subject of state regulation. Of our major industries affecting interstate commerce
only insurance, oil production, and banking are subjects of significant state regulation.
Second, the regulation by the state parallels that by the national government.
There is no distinction in kind, as between things national and things local in import,
in the authorities over chartering and examination of banks. The national govern-
ment and the state governments are, with respect to chartering and examination,
doing the same things. This is an unusual feature in the federal system. It results in
competitive federalism in contrast to the cooperative federalism so often described.
Third, the regulated persons can choose the jurisdiction to which they will be
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subject. This distinguishes banking regulation from all other fields of regulation
in this country4
Fourth, there is a substantial "delegation" policy decisions-especially on branch
banking but also on many other matters-by the national to the state governments.
This kind of development in American federalism became familiar to American legal
scholars in the late nineteenth century, as the result of national legislation on trans-
portation of liquor into states with prohibition laws.5 It is revealed in much of our
later legislation-for example, in that concerning resale price maintenance0 and
regulation of labor practices' Yet it is doubtful whether it is as significant in any
other field of legislation, except insurance regulation,8 as it is in banking legislation.
Fifth, the regulatory position of the states is being encircled and partially eclipsed
by the assertion of national policy on matters affecting banking. Encirclement leaves
state chartering undisturbed but confines or overrides the policy of the state-either
directly by enactments having compulsory effect or indirectly by absorption of state
banks into national systems by their option. Especially significant in this regard are
the development of the Federal Reserve System and the provision for federal deposit
insurance. State banks entering either are subject, irrespective of state laws, to
national policies and to national supervision. Encirclement and reduction of the
position of the state is a typical aspect of regulatory legislation in the American federal
system. Also, the development runs counter to the policy of delegation or deference
to state policy that characterizes much national banking legislation. Yet with respect
to the Federal Reserve System and federal deposit insurance, it retains still a peculiar
feature: subjection to national policy is optional for those who choose the other option
for a state charter.
Sixth, cooperative relationships have developed between the national and state
banking authorities. This has been necessary because of double supervision of state
banks, brought about by the Federal Reserve and deposit insurance acts. In these
cooperative arrangements, banking regulation reflects one of the outstanding aspects
of American federalism Here again, however, the developments are somewhat
atypical: the coercive authority of the national government is limited by the options
available to the regulated; the pivotal fact in the pattern is the abdication of govern-
ment's positive power to the choice of the private party.
The ensuing pages will sketch the historical and constitutional background of the
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dual banking system, will detail the particular aspects of federal-state relationships
suggested above, and will examine finally some current arguments and issues relative
to dual banking.
HISTORICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
It will be useful, prior to analysis of specific functional aspects, to review a slice
of history and a slice of constitutional framework with respect to the rise and
survival of dual banking in our federal system.
On history, we can note three phases of development. The first period-from
Hamilton to Jackson-was one of dual banking. A national bank with branches
existed from 179i to 18ii and again from 1817 to 1836 (at which time the second
Bank of the United States expired as such by obtaining a charter from the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania). During this period, which began with only three banks
existing in the nation, banks were chartered in increasing numbers by the several
states. The second period-from Jackson to Chase, from 1836 to i863-was a period
of state and private banking exclusively. The third period-from 1863 to the
present-is one in which dual banking has been revived and continued.
There are several aspects of the transition to a dual banking system that are
worthy of note in a story of federalism. The first is that the father of the system did
not intend to create it. Chase believed that a tax on state bank notes, which was
enacted as he predicted in i865,'° would "root out the heterogeneous local banks," and
bring their capital into the national system." That the state banks survived was
due to the fact, unforeseen by Chase, that deposits could replace note issuance as a
source for loan capital adequate for profitable banking operations. The dual banking
system resulted, therefore, from a fortuitous development in the private sector of the
economy and in spite of the contrary intention and judgment of the chief proponent
of the legislation that produced national banking as we know it.
Second, the national banking system that was established was patterned, as has
often been true in the history of American federalism, after the system developed in
the laboratories of state experience. Instead of a unified national banking system,
with a single bank and branches, such as had been created under legislation of i791
and 1817, there were separately chartered, independent banking units. The in-
fluence of the antimonopoly spirit, which had given rise to charges against the first
and second Banks of the United States, is obvious. The national system follows the
pattern of "free banking" that had evolved in the states, thus resulting in a true
parallelism between national and state systems.
Third, while, for Chase, as well as for his predecessor, Hamilton, the fiscal needs
"°Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 78, § 6, 13 Stat. 484.
"Letter from Salmon P. Chase to T. C. Day, Feb. 5, 1863, quoted in T. J. ANarsoN, FEDERAL. AND
STATE CONTROL or BANKING 72 (1934), and in A. McF. DAvis, THE ORIGIN OF THE NATIONAL BANKING
SYsTEM 77 (1910) •
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of the national government were dominant in the planning of the banking system,
the survival of parallel national and state banks was due to the response of both to
the needs of commerce and industry. The survival of each type of bank has been
dependent upon its ability to compete with the other type in the private market for
banking services.
The constitutional foundations for a dual banking system were established early
in our history in one of the monumental decisions of American federalism. Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland2 determined, first, that the national government's constitutional
authority, by the delegation of express and implied powers, extended to the creation
of a national bank and the establishment of branches. It determined, second,
that a state could not impair the operation of an agency so established as an instru-
mentality of the national government. The decision related specifically to a state
tax on the bank but was broad enough to cover any other type of state interference.
It was broad, also, in that it did not inhibit merely nondiscriminatory taxation but
any taxation of a federal instrumentality. The constitutional foundations for a
national-and thus, also, a dual-system of banking were thus established in the
principles of this first Supreme Court decision relating to the scope of national
power and its correlative protection.
Constitutional issues concerning state power to grant functions to banking insti-
tutions arose over the note issuance function. In Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky (1837),
it was held that state banks could issue notes, even when stock in the state bank was
held by the state?'3 This construction of the constitutional limitation on the power of
the state to issue paper money was strong support for the kind of state banking system
that existed prior to the Civil War. The effect of the decision was ultimately over-
come by that in Veazie Bank v. Fenno (x869), which upheld the prohibitory tax of
ten per cent on state-bank notes and thus established, through the unilateral taxing
power, complete national authority over note issuance. 4
McCulloch v. Maryland has been the precedent for other decisions with respect
to national banks. On its authority, the constitutionality of the Banking Act of
863 was upheld.' 5 The limitations on the states with respect to these banks were
stated by the Supreme Court in Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank in 1896:'"
National Banks are instrumentalities of the Federal government, created for a
public purpose, and as such necessarily subject to the paramount authority of the
United States. It follows that an attempt, by a State, to define their duties or
control the conduct of their affairs is absolutely void, wherever such attempted
exercise of authority expressly conflicts with the laws of the United States, and
either frustrates the purpose of the national legislation or impairs the efficiency of
12 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (x819).
a36 U.S. (ii Pet.) 257 (1837).
1475 US. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869).
"
5 Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29 (875).
28 161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896). The quoted words would probably reflect more accurately the law
today if or were substituted for and after the phrase "laws of the United States."
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these agencies of the Federal government to discharge the duties, for the performance
of which they were created.
On the other hand, in the federal system local laws on many matters are applicable
to national banks. On this, too, the Supreme Court early summarized the position
of national banks:17
They are subject to the laws of the State, and are governed in their daily course of
business far more by the laws of the State than of the nation. All their contracts
are governed and construed by State laws. Their acquisition and transfer of prop-
erty, their right to collect their debts, and their liability to be sued for debts, are
all based on State law. It is only when the State law incapacitates the banks from
discharging their duties to the government that it becomes unconstitutional.
National legislation has permitted the expansion of state functions. As early as
1864 taxing authority over shares of national banks was granted to the states."8 Since
then, national policy has not only allowed the application of nondiscriminatory state
legislation to national banks but has adopted state policy on state banking as national
policy for national banks so extensively that a separate section of this article is
devoted to the subject of national deference to state policy.
State banks do not have immunity from national legislation comparable to that
of national banks from state legislation. They must pay the corporate income
tax; they are subject to national legislation under the commerce power; and they
are subject to the exercise of Congress's monetary powers.
The question can now be raised as to whether the dual banking system has any
constitutional protection. Could Congress abolish the system directly by requiring
a national charter to engage in deposit banking? Or could it accomplish virtually
the same thing by requiring state-bank membership in the Federal Reserve System
and extending the conditions of membership or by requiring, with regulatory strings
attached, deposit insurance through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation?
Arguments of great strength can be made for an affirmative answer to either question.
They would start from three premises: (i) that Congress's power to establish and
protect a national banking system having been established, it is within its power to
preserve the soundness and service of that system against the competition of state
banking systems operating under different, often more lenient, standards; (2) that
Congress has a paramount authority over the monetary system of the nation and in
the exercise of this authority can impose necessary and appropriate controls over all
institutions whose operations affect the volume and quality of the monetary supply;
and (3) that, since banking affects the commerce of the nation, Congress has power
to regulate it in all its aspects in order to make effective the national policies with
respect to commerce. The larger argument, of which these are parts, is that, as a
result of what our Constitution has become, Congress has the authority to use
'1 National Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 362 (869).
" Act of June 3, 1864, ch. io6, § 41, 13 Stat. iii, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1964).
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whatever means are appropriate to maintain a healthy economy. A state charter
cannot endow banking institutions with any immunity from national power that
Congress chooses to exercise, and Congress has discretion to choose among appropriate
means of exercising its powers, including a national charter, membership in a national
banking system, or direct imposition of legislative or administrative rules over bank-
ing institutions. If, therefore, the conditions in the nation and the interests of
economic groups should create political demands of sufficient force to produce an act
of Congress to unify the banking structure of the nation, it is inconceivable that
the Supreme Court would hold that the legislation was unrelated to the paramount
purposes of the great constitutional grants of power.' In banking, as in many other
fields of legislation, what characterizes congressional choices is not encroachment on
state power but nonexercise of national power.
It does not appear likely, at this point in time, that Congress will soon abolish
the dual banking system, but it does appear that the degree of independence of the
state banks from national controls will be determined in the forum of national
politics as a result of influences brought to bear on Congress and the President.
II
DUAL CHARTERING
The basis of the dual banking system is the issuance of charters by two juris-
dictions. The charters grant the right to do business, and the chartering jurisdiction
determines the conditions for receiving the charters and for doing business under
them. The charter for banking rights is more than a mere grant of power to do
business, as is in effect true of corporate charters generally; it is, in addition, a means
of establishing a system of regulation over entry and operations.
For the states, there is nothing unique about this system. They began early in
their history to grant charters and have attached to them such regulatory provisions
as they desired to impose. In the early days the states guarded jealously the grant
of charter privileges and limited charter rights by regulatory provisions and super-
vision. Free chartering of corporations-that is, chartering virtually without regula-
tory prescriptions-came later and did not establish itself in banking, even though
there were tendencies in this direction in the initial period of so-called "free banking"
prior to the Civil War.
For the national government, the system is peculiar. That government has used
its power to grant charters very sparingly. It has, moreover, except for banking, not
used the charter as the means of imposing a system of regulation. It has, of course,
often used other forms of enabling powers-namely, licensing and certificates of
"°An argument, reflected in Hopkins Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315 (1935), might
be based on state sovereignty and the reserved-power clause of the tenth amendment. However, little
is left of the tenth amendment since United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (194), which characterized
it as a "truism" and held it ineffective to curb an exercise of a granted federal power in a reasonable
fashion.
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public convenience and necessity-in establishing regulations; but more often it has
imposed its regulation on concerns already having acquired the right to engage in
business from a state charter. In banking, however, the exercise of regulatory juris-
diction begins with the charter grant.
A. Fluctuation in the Relative Strengths of the National
and State Banking Systems
Dual chartering has created a real dualism in banking. National and state systems
for nearly a hundred years have both been strong, and vigorous competition has
existed between the two systems. The relative strength of each at various times is
patently revealed in Table i, which sets forth figures on the number of national
and state banks at particular times. As Table I illustrates, the act of 1863 did not
TABLE i
NUMBER OF STAT-CHARTEaRE AND FEDERALLY CHARTERED BANKS, BY YEARs
National State National National State National
Year Banks Banks Banks Year Banks Banks Banks
1864 508 1,089 31.8 1916 7,608 15,450 33.0
1865 1,513 349 81.3 1920 8,157 18,195 31.0
1866 1,644 297 84.7 1925 8,054 16,983 32.2
1869 1,617 259 86.2 1930 7,197 13,582 34.6
1870 1,648 325 83.5 1935 5,386 8,420 39.0
1875 2,086 551 79.1 1940 5,144 9,182 35.9
18SO 2,095 620 77.2 1945 5,017 8,964 35.9
1885 2,732 975 73.7 1950 4,958 9,046 35.4
1890 3,573 2,101 63.0 1955 4,692 8,932 34.4
1895 3,706 3,774 49.5 1960 4,529 8,853 33.8
1900 3,871 4,369 47.0 1961 4,512 8,920 33.6
1910 6,984 12,166 36.5 1962 4,504 8,924 33.5
1915 7,632 14,598 34.3 1963 4,614 8,954 34.0
1964 4,722 8,988 34.7
Source: The figures used in this table may be not be as reliable as one would ordinarily wish, ince in a few instances the sources relied
upon are not consistent among theirselves. Figures are given for five-year intervals (except 1905) and for additional years to which ref-
erence is made in the text. Overall, the representation in believed to be fair. The data were collected from Joi, CoIN . oseru Ecoxosc
RnpocT, 82n CONG., 21 SEsS., hIONETARY POLICY Asn Tax MANG.E(uehr OF THu PuamLc DE:BT. p. 1 at 554 (Joint Comm. Print 1952), and
Co-orxooR or 'rE CuRsoNcY ANY. REp. for the following yearn: 1900 (vol. 1, pp. ix, 572-74, 577-93); 1910 (pp. 334, 792); 1915 (vol. 2,
p. 951); 1920 (vol. 2, pp. 36, 840); 1925 (p. 636); 1930 (pp. 367, 752); 1935 (pp. 740-41); 1940 (pp. 222-23); 1945 (pp. 13637); 1950 (pp.
154-55); 1955 (pp. 2, 192-93); 1960 (pp. 260-61); 1964 (p. 20).
immediately attract a large number of applications for national bank status, and most
of the applications were from banks with small capitalization. A ruling of the
Comptroller that state banks coming into the system could retain their names, with
the prefix "national," caused state banks to come "into the national system with
a rush.' 20 There were at the end of 1864 about half as many national banks as
state banks. The enactment of the ten per cent tax on state-bank notes accelerated
the conversion of state banks into national banks and threatened the extinction of
state banking. The number of state banks dropped from i,o89 in 1864 to less than
20H. MCCULLOCH, MEN AND MEASURES OF HALF A CENTURY 170 (1889), quoted in ANDERSON,
stupra note II, at 75.
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300 in 1866 and remained at that level through 1869. In the meantime the number
of national banks more than tripled, rising to and remaining at a level of more than
i,6oo in the years i866 to 1869. The state banks in this period were consistently less
than one-sixth of the total of national and state banks.
The demonstration of the profitability of deposit banking and of the nonessentiality
of the note-issue function led in the following years to an increasing exercise of the
option for a state instead of a national charter. The increase in the percentage of
state banks began in 187o, and by 1885 they were slightly over one-fourth of the total
of chartered banks. The increase continued gradually, and in 1895 the number of
state banks became larger than the number of national banks. At no time since
have national banks exceeded the number of state banks. The proportion of state
banks continued to increase over a protracted period and in 1916 reached for the first
time two-thirds of the total of chartered banks. This proportion remained fairly
steady until the depression of 1929. Thereafter the proportion of state banks fell
somewhat. From the late i93os there were for years about nine state banks to
every five national banks. It is obvious from the figures that the passage of the
Federal Reserve and deposit insurance acts in 1913 and 1933, respectively, had no
appreciable impact on the dual chartering of banks.
After a long period of comparative equilibrium, there was again in the middle
i95os a slight rise in the percentage of state banks, and this trend continued until
the early 196os. In i96o national banks constituted 33.8 per cent of all banks, yet by
1964 national banks represented 34.7 per cent of the total. These figures reflect a net
increase of 193 national banks over the four years, in contrast to a corresponding
increase of 135 state banks over the same period. The early 196os also marked the
first period in almost forty years in which the absolute number of national banks
had shown an increase. Some of the factors contributing to this reversal of trend
are discussed below.
Figures on the number of banks do not, of course, tell a complete story, for they
do not show the size of banks in each category. Statistics on bank size also dem-
onstrate the durability of the dual banking system and, more important, reflect more
dramatically the recent trend to national bank status. As of December 31, 1965,
national banks constituted approximately thirty-four per cent of the total number
of banks, yet held fifty-one per cent of all bank assets.21 This represented an increase
from 45.6 per cent in 1962 in the proportionate share of assets held by national
banks.2 2 The greater proportionate increase in the assets controlled by national banks
over the number of banks in the national-bank category is explained, of course, by
the large size of the banks that converted from state to national status. The Chase
Manhattan Bank of New York was the largest state-chartered bank in the country
211965 FDIC ANN. REP. 99.
" Based on data given in x962 FDIC ANN. REP. 46.
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when it converted in 1965. This important development is reviewed below as a
means of identifying some aspects of the new impetus for a switch to national charters.
B. The Relative Competitive Positions of National and State Banks
It has often been stated that one effect of the dual banking system has been to
create "competition in laxity" between national and state governments.23 It is
undoubtedly true that applicants for charters have been sensitive to differences in
requirements on capitalization, size of reserves, loan privileges, and other matters.
They have been sensitive, also, to differences in the rigor of bank examinations and
reporting requirements. There have been factors that gave a competitive advantage to
the state in the options offered to those entering the banking business. Lower
capitalization and reserve requirements and more liberal loan policies have often
made state chartering more attractive than national chartering. National banks were
not allowed to make real estate loans until 1916, to act in fiduciary capacities until
1913, and to engage in branch banking until 1927. The assumption of authority by the
Comptroller of the Currency in i909 to consider community needs for banking in the
granting of charters led to a more restrictive policy than existed in many states whose
policies leaned toward "free banking."'24 The Federal Reserve Board's institution of
compulsory par clearance in 1916, which was vigorously opposed by many banks with-
in the Federal Reserve System, made state banking without Reserve membership still
more attractive to many banks.25 Compulsory membership in the Federal Reserve
System for national banks is itself a deterrent to choice of national bank status by
some banking institutions. Reserve membership entails subjection to many restric-
tions not applicable to nonmembers.
There have been liberalizations of national bank restrictions that had the effect of
making the national system more competitive. Notable was the lowering in i9oo
of minimum capital requirements from $5oooo to $25,ooo. The lower level remained
in effect until 1933. In 19o6 national banks were authorized to lend to one person
or firm ten per cent of its capital and surplus instead of ten per cent of its capital
alone. Among other instances of liberalization have been the authority to lend on
real estate, to engage in fiduciary relationships, to accept time deposits, to establish
branches in states granting the privilege, and to act as broker or agent in small cities
in placing loans on real estate.
The competitive advantages of the state systems, and the "competition in laxity,"
have sometimes been of deep concern to some authorities on banking. This concern
was repeatedly expressed in the i92os, especially after the rise in number of bank
failures during the Depression. The Comptroller commented at length in 1922 on
"' See, e.g., authority cited note 35 infra.
"' See 1909 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ANN. REP. 18; 1910 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY
ANN. REP. i8-i9.
" For a story of the par remittance controversy, see ANDERSON, supra note i , at 89-142.
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the threat to national bank status in the option for membership in the Federal Reserve
System offered to state banks.2" In 1926 he reported that from October 31, 1923 to
October 17, 1925, i66 national banks with assets of $566,6oo,ooo converted to state
banks, and that from October 17, 1925 to October i, 1926, another eighty-seven with
assets of about $560 million converted. During the latter period, in contrast, twenty-
nine state banks with assets of about $235 million converted to national banks.2 7
Professor H. Parker Willis of Columbia University submitted to Congress in 1926 a
lengthy and thorough analysis of deficiencies in state bank supervision. 8 Admission
of national banks to the privileges of state banks in branch banking was presented as
a remedy by persons testifying in 1926 on the McFadden bill.29 But the greatest
concern came after the rash of bank failures in the Depression. Figures have been
assembled that show a superior record on bank failure for banks under national
supervision from 1921 to 1932. The average annual rate of suspensions during that
period was 4.08 per cent of the average number of nonmember banks, but only
1.88 per cent for member banks and 1.79 per cent for national banksf0 The failure
between i93o and 1932 of 5,o96 banks, of which 4,062 were nonmember banks,"'
made banking policy the foremost issue for the nation. There were some who held
the view succinctly expressed by Senator Carter Glass, a national banking authority:
"The dual system of banking has seemed to me to be an almost insuperable obstacle
in the way of sound banking legislation."32
Yet the reforms of 1933 and 1935 found solutions to the immediate problems
without any attack on dual chartering. The requirements on national banks alone
and on member banks were tightened. Deposit insurance provided a means of
national supervision without requiring national charters. By providing new security
for all banks it safeguarded dual chartering. In effect, insurance of deposits of
minimum size under national supervision also insured the dual banking system.
From 1935 to i96i the competitive positions of national and state banking remained
relatively stable, and security has yielded to other banking issues. Recently, there
has been a movement toward liberalization of banking privileges, with the national
government taking the initiative. From I96I to 1966 Comptroller Saxon liberalized
the rules for national banks in numerous ways. Back of this development was the
recognition of the strong competitition for commercial banks from other types of
financial institutions and the belief that loan privileges could be extended without
serious decline in the quality of loans. Because of liberalization at the national
20 1922 COMPTRoLLER OF THE CuRRENCY ANN. REP. 2-3.
27 1926 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ANN. REP. 2.
" Hearings on S. z782 and H.R. 2 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Cur-
rency, 69th Cong., Ist Sess. 46-I6o (1926).
2 id. at 16 ff.
30 ANDERSON, supra note II, at 312.
311d.
32 Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 71 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Cur.
rency, 71st Cong., 3d Sess., pt. i, at 265 (1931).
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level, state banking authorities have had to re-examine their rules. For example,
reports by a prestigious advisory committee in New York in December 1965 and
September 1966 assessed the competitive inequalities between New York state banks
and national banks, and made many recommendations for liberalization of state
requirements.33 It is inevitable that liberalization at the national level will have an
influence on state regulations,34 in the same way that liberal rules in state jurisdictions
had an effect in earlier periods on the national rules35
C. Illustrations of the Recent Trend to National Bank Status
The most startling manifestation of the new trend toward national bank status
was the conversion of New York's Chase Manhattan Bank to a national charter in
1965. At that time it was the largest state-chartered bank and the third largest com-
mercial bank in the United States. Other large banks, including the (now) Provident
National Bank in Philadelphia and the Mercantile Trust Company of St. Louis, have
made the switch in recent years.
Shortly after the Chase decided to renounce its i66-year-old state charter, an article
discussing the implications of the conversion appeared in the New York Times. 6
In an interview with the Times reporter, one of Chase's senior officials summed up
the chief advantages of being a national bank in one word--"flexibility." More spe-
cifically, the officer was reported as citing the following as among its reasons for the
change: (i) "some states, such as Pennsylvania and Illinois, summarily prohibit state
chartered banks of other states from doing business in their territory"; (2) "cer-
tificates of deposit of national banks ... [are] not subject to 'blue sky laws' "; and
(3) "state banks 'still can't sell [travelers checks] in Illinois and Pennsylvania.'"
The president of the Provident National Bank was reported as pointing out that
"stockholders of state chartered banks living in states other than those in which the
bank operates paid taxes on dividends, which was not the case with stockholders of
national banks." And both he and the president of Mercantile Trust added that "the
swiftness with which Mr. Saxon acted on branching applications was a factor." In
this connection, the reporter suggested that "in New York, as in some other states,
consideration must also be given to the effect on state chartered mutual savings banks,
an obstacle Mr. Saxon does not face." Other factors which the Times discussion
33 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON COMERCIAL BANK SUPERVISION, REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE SUPERIN-
TENDENT OF BANKS OF STATE OF NEW YORK (December 1965) [hereinafter cited as NEw YoRK ADVISORY
CommITrEE, FIRST REPORT]; ADVISORY COmmITTEE ON COMMSERCIAL BANK SUPERVISION, SECoND REPORT
SUBMITTED TO THE SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (September 1966).
- See Wille, State Banking: A Study in Dual Regulation, in this symposium, p. 733.
" For a view that there is still a dangerous tendency toward a "race of laxity," see the statement of
J. L. Robertson, Member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, in Hearings on Proposed
Federal Banking Commission and Federal Deposit and Savings Insurance Board Be/ore the Subcomm. on
Bank Supervision and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., Ist Sess.
X74, 177 (1963). See also Robertson, Federal Regulation of Banking: A Plea for Unification, in this
symposium, p. 673.
10 Frost, Chase Bank Move Has Broad Impact, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1965, § 3, at a, col. 8.
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mentioned as favoring national bank status were that: (i) "state chartered banks
operating in other states are taxed as 'out-of-state corporations,' while national banks
are immune from such taxes"; (2) "the New York lawmakers have . . . failed to
give its state chartered banks the right to go into direct equipment leasing and the
factoring business"; and (3) "national banks have been given broader powers in the
underwriting of certain tax-exempt issues."
Several striking features of the new intersystem competition are evident. First,
the competitive handicaps cited by the Chase were not strictly those attributable to
New York law, which at the time was relatively up to date if not in advance of the
field in modernization; the defensive laws of other states, preventing or inhibiting
various kinds of interstate business except under a national charter, were perhaps the
primary factor cited. In addition, the motivating factors in recent years are apt also
to include regulatory differences originating at the national level in conflicts between
the Comptroller and the other two banking agencies in Washington. 7 The result
of these circumstances is that no state legislature can rectify the situation acting
alone, either because the problem results from the laws of other states or because it
reflects the multiplicity of regulatory systems at the national level. Thus, the
banking business and bank regulation have apparently become so complex and per-
vasive that state systems no longer fully control their own destiny through the
power to legislate inducements. We will have occasion below to see how the states
are being encircled and regulatory power drained to Washington.
III
BANK SUPERVISION
While grant or denial of charters is the initial means of enforcing the requirements
of national and state banking laws, continuous enforcement of these policies is
sought by examination and by requirement of reports. All bank supervisory agencies
depend on these two techniques of supervision. Regular, and sometimes special,
reports are required. Examinations are conducted on regular schedules and are
supplemented on occasions by additional examinations of particular banks deemed to
be in need of more than normal supervision.
Exercise of these functions is divided in the national government. The Federal
Reserve officials call for one regular report a year from banks subject to their juris-
diction, and may require a second one. The FDIC calls for reports on a selective
basis. The Comptroller calls for regular and sometimes for special reports. All
three agencies are interested in bank examinations, but the Comptroller in practice
conducts all bank examinations for solvent national banks. Every state has a banking
board or commission, or a banking commissioner, or a combination of the two, with
titles varying among the states. These require reports and conduct examinations.
" See generally Robertson, Federal Regulation of Banking: A Plea for Unification, in this symposium,
p. 673; wVile, supra note 34.
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In addition, state member banks are examined by the Federal Reserve Board and
nonmember insured banks by the FDIC.
Although facts for comparison of the quality of bank examinations in national and
state jurisdictions are not at hand, some factors that may affect quality can be
noted. As of August 26, 1966, the Comptroller had I,13o regular bank examiners and
ninety-seven specialized examiners for trust departments of banks. There is approxi-
mately one regular bank examiner for every four national banks. New examiners
with bachelor's degrees are recruited as trainees with annual salaries, in August 1966,
of $6,461. A fully trained bank examiner with full responsibility as an examiner had
a minimum grade of GS-ii and a minimum salary of $9,221. Bank examiners and
supervisors on the job had salaries ranging from $7,550 to $23,P13. The average grade
level was GS-9 and the average tenure was about twelve years. The Comptroller's
term is only five years, and most Comptrollers have not finished their terms, due
primarily to lucrative offers of other employment;"8 nevertheless, the traditions and
practices of the long-established agency with respect to bank examinations have
produced continuity and great stability in standards.
A questionnaire to the state banking authorities on banking personnel brought
a reply from forty-three states. The replies to questions, insofar as these were given,
are tabulated in Table 2. Only in New York do salary levels of examiners appear
to be fully comparable to those in the national service. In a few others (California,
Iowa) the top salary reaches $i5,ooo per annum. Average salaries in the states were
not obtained, but the lower and upper limits indicate distinctly lower salaries in many
states than in the national service. Average tenure reported for examiners ranged
from two and a half years in Nebraska, three and a half in Montana, four in
Wyoming, and four and a half in Vermont to fifteen in Arkansas and twenty in
Tennessee. Average tenure of commissioners in states having a board or commission
ranged from three in Kansas, Ohio, and South Dakota to ten in Montana, with many
states not reporting; of commissioners in states with a single bank commissioner from
one and a half in Minnesota and two in Nebraska to sixteen in Tennessee and nearly
fifteen in Delaware, again with many states not reporting. Figures on average
number of banks per examiner varied greatly and are apparently without significance
because of variations in size of banks and number of branches within the several
states. It is apparent that these figures offer little basis for firm conclusions. It does
appear that in many states salaries for bank examiners are low in comparison with
those in the national system and that tenure of bank examiners is also relatively low
in some state systems.
Despite differences in requirements in the several jurisdictions and in the pro-
visions for supervision, there has been a tendency toward uniformity in standards.
Chairman Martin of the Federal Reserve Board reported to a House subcommittee in
"s For a summary of Comptrollers' backgrounds, tenure, and resignations, see Fox, supra note 4, at
13o-i6.
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TABLE 2
DATA CONCERNING STATE BANK SUPERVISORY AGENCIES
Examiners
Salary W (
0 o . *
0~~ a)C
004
StateZS From To , .
Alaska ..............
Arizona .............
Arkansas ............
California ...........
Delaware ............
Florida ..............
Georgia .............
Hawaii ..............
Indiana .............
Iowa ................
Kentucky ...........
Kansas ..............
Louisiana ...........
Maine ..............
Minnesota ...........
Mississippi ..........
Missouri ............
Montana ............
Nebraska ............
Nevada .............
New Hampshire ......
New Jersey ..........
New Mexico .........
New York ...........
North Carolina ......
Ohio ................
Oklahoma ...........
Oregon ..............
Pennsylvania ........
South Carolina ......
South Dakota .......
Tennessee ...........
Texas ...............
Utah ...............
Vermont ............
Virginia .............
West Virginia .......
Wisconsin ..........
Wyoming ...........
9
12
182
98
17
248
334
5
303
567
267
430
172
59
530
155
573
84
307
6
17
30
133
114
319
201
40
204
103
135
221
593
43
27
141
109
480
29
1 part-tim
7
15
59
6
32
22
14
17
43
16
20
18
12
48
23
55
8
20
7
15
43
6
301
22
33
16
6
61
13
8
18
23
12
6
24
11
(authorized)
35
5
> $50 per day <
S6,000 $8,400
$6,000 89,000
$8,532 $15,300
$5,000 $8,500
$4,200 $10,560
$6,372 813,908
$6,300 $11,940
$5,760 $12,840
$6,000 815,000
$5,484 89,852
$6,062 $11,940
$7,200 $11,160
$5,148 $10,712
$5,616 S11,856
$10,000
$6,500 $10,000
$6,000 $9,600
$5,100 $10,000
$7,080 $8,760
$6,200 $11,830
$6,063 $14,151
$5,040 $9,620
$8,365 $23,900
$6,036 $11,808
$5,520 $9,000
$6,600 $8,700
$6,300 $10,140
$6,090 $11,501
$5,775 $10,707
$5,400 89,000
$6,000 $10,800
$7,500 $14,400
$5,388 $12,732
$5,174 $8,372
$5,640 $10,992
$4,800 $9,600
$7,000 $16,000
$5,700 $8,460
5 1/6
15
6 5/6
6 1/2
7 1/2
9 1/2
7
3 1/2
2 1/2
10
10 1/2
7
10
4 1/2
15 1/2
20
4 1/2
4
4
12
3 1/3
14 11/12
4
4
4
4 to 8
4 5/12
1 1/2
2
6
9
5 2/3
4
3 1/4
16
4 1/3
3 1/2
7
5
6
Source: Author's questionnaire to bank supervisory authority in each state. Other states did not respond.
1963 that over the years there had been a considerable amount of cooperation among
the national agencies and with the state supervisors of banking, especially in develop-
ing and maintaining desirable and uniform standards of supervisionY0 Such
standardization was inevitable after the offer of deposit insurance to state banks.
" Statement by William McChesney Martin, Jr., Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, in Hearings, supra note 35, at 168.
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Agreements on bank examinations and reporting procedure were worked out by
the three national agencies and the Executive Committee of the National Association
of Supervisors of State Banks in 1938 and renewed in 1949. Today, there is coopera-
tion through concurrent examinations, alternate examinations by national and state
examiners, and exchange of reports between national and state authorities. Although
some states reported on a questionnaire that no concurrent or alternate examinations
were arranged, most states reported the opposite. New York, for example, reported
as follows:
State-chartered commercial banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System
are examined concurrently by State and Federal Reserve examiners. A separate
report is issued by each agency. Insured, non-member commercial banks and
savings banks chartered by the State are usually examined concurrently by state
examiners and Federal Deposit Insurance examiners.
Pennsylvania reported rather precisely:
About 75 percent of all examinations are conducted on joint, cooperative basis with
Federal Reserve and FDIC. The other 25 percent alternate since state examiners on
occasion are all needed to conduct joint examination of large member or non-
member banks, and on these occasions, the other federal supervisory agency will
conduct independent examinations.
A number of states reported the general practice of a concurrent examination on one
examination a year, but with variations in the practice where schedules of state
examiners and those of FDIC examiners, particularly for small bank examinations,
could not be coordinated. Bank supervision presents, therefore, another example of
cooperative federalism. 4
0
IV
NATIONAL DEFERENCE TO STATE POLICY
In numerous statutory provisions the national government accepts the policy of
the several states, for their respective jurisdictions, as controlling for national bank
operations and national policy on banking. This deference to the states extends from
the simple comity that one jurisdiction accords another to what appears to be
outright delegation of major policy decisions by Congress to the separate states. In
general the overriding national policy has been one of promoting "competitive equal-
ity" between national and state banks as the most feasible means of preserving dual
banking.' Competitive equality might also have been achieved by legislation ex-
tending national regulation to state banks to whatever degree was necessary to
protect the national banking system; 42 Congress's decision to give wider scope to
"0 See Wille, supra note 34, at 735-38.
"First Nat'l Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252 (,966) (involving competitive
equality in the field of branch banking), discussed in text accompanying notes 61-63 infra.
4' Cf. Houston, E. & W. T. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (the Shreveport case).
It may be significant that Congress chose rather not to diminish the role of the states in bank regulation.
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local law thus represents not so much a delegation of national power as a refusal to
exercise that power to its fullest extent 3
A. Trust Operations and Miscellaneous Actions
The policy of the Congress on allowing trust operations by national banks is to
give them a position comparable to, but no more favorable than, that of state banks.
To accomplish this the policies of the states with respect to state banks are accepted
for national banks. The national statute authorizes the Comptroller to grant by
special permit to national banks, on their application, those particular trust powers
allowed to state banks, trust companies, or other corporations which come into com-
petition with national banks4 A rule of comity allows state banking authorities
access to reports of examination by the Comptroller insofar as these relate to trust
operations but does not allow state access to the records of the banks.4" Another
statutory provision requires national banks acting in a fiduciary capacity to deposit
securities with state authorities for protection of private or court trusts when state
law requires this of corporations; national banks can execute bonds in such cases if
state law requires it for other corporations.a State policy is also adopted in a pro-
vision that prohibits grant of a permit to a national bank for fiduciary powers unless
it has capital and surplus equal to that required by state law for state banks, trust
companies, or other corporations exercising fiduciary powers. 47 Also, a national
bank desiring to terminate trust powers must show to the Comptroller that it has been
relieved of all requirements of state law on its trust operations4 8 Regulation Nine
of the Comptroller on "Fiduciary Powers of National Banks and Collective Invest-
ment Funds" makes numerous types of action by national banks contingent upon
authorization of, or not being in contravention of, local law (i.e., "the law of the
State or other jurisdiction governing the fiduciary relationship")."
Similar deference to state law is shown in other provisions of the banking laws.
Thus, the rate of interest allowed for a national banking association is that allowed
"8 It does not seem necessary to debate whether we have here cases of delegation of legislative power
in the usual sense. See, e.g., L. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIoN ch. 2 (r965);
K. C. DAvis, ADmINzs'RATivE LAw TREATISE ch. 2 (1958). However, it does seem that Congress adopted
the chosen approach not as a means of turning the regulatory problems over to agents more capable of
handling the difficult economic issues, or even of weighing supposed "local interests," but merely as an
expedient means of maintaining the desired competitive equality. Also notable is the difficulty the
state may encounter in effectively enforcing state policy under the present scheme. See Comment,
Banks and Banking: Authority of State Banking Superintendent to Challenge Branching Activities ol
National Banks, 1967 DUKE LJ. 72, discussing the ability of state banking officials to bring suit under state
law (a pre-emption problem) or under federal law (a standing problem) to enforce state branching
policies against national banks where the Comptroller of the Currency has improperly applied state law.
The student author has posed nicely some of the delicate federalism problems created by recent efforts of
the Comptroller to subvert restrictive state policies in the interest of freer banking.
4t12 U.S.C. § 92a(a) (1964).
41 12 U.S.C. § 92a(c) (1964).
4oI2 U.S.C. § 92a(f) (1964).
47 12 U.S.C. § 92a(i) (1964).
48 12 U.S.C. § 92a(j) (x964).
40 12 C.F.R. § 9.'(f) (Supp. 1966).
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by the state for its state banks, if a rate is fixed by the state. 0 Thus, also, a national
bank shall not be organized in a city of more than 5o,ooo population with capital of
less than $iooooo, except in outlying districts where state law allows organization
with a smaller capitalization.51 Again, a state bank may be converted into a national
bank, provided such conversion "shall not be in contravention of the State law." 2
B. Branch Banking
The most significant national deference to the states is on branch banking. On
this-as on trust powers-the national government adopts the policies of the states,
once again apparently in order to insure equality between national and state banks.
National policy-or lack of policy-on branch banking is, therefore, a substantial
support for the existing system of dual banking.
An amendment to the National Banking Act in 1865 allowed a state bank with
branches to become a national banking association and retain its branches.53 No
other authority for branch banking by national banks appeared in the statutes until
1927,r 4 at which time the need was felt to protect national banks against branching
by state bank competitors in states where branching was permitted. The McFadden
Act in I927,"5 and subsequent amendments of 193356 and 19 6 2,"7 generally authorized
branch banking by national banks on conditions equivalent to those for state banks.
The requirement for conformity with state law, contained in section 36(c) of the
National Banking Act, is seemingly a tight one: a national bank may be authorized
by the Comptroller to establish and operate branches (I) within its city, town, or
village "if such establishment and operation are at the time expressly authorized
to State banks by the law of the State in question,"-" or (2) anywhere in the state
"if such establishment and operation are at the time authorized to State banks by
the statute law of the State in question by language specifically granting such
authority affirmatively and not merely by implication or recognition, and subject to
the restrictions as to location imposed by the law of the State on State banks."'59
In addition, the national bank establishing branches outside its city must have
the minimum capital stock, or capital stock and surplus combined, required by state
law for a state bank establishing branches."
GO 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1964).
15112 U.S.C. § 51 (1964).
r2 12 U.S.C. § 35 (1964).
"
5 Act of March 3, x865, ch. 78, § 7, 13 Stat. 484.
" First Nat'l Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640 (1924).
"Act of Feb. 25, 1927, Ch. 191, § 7, 44 Star. 1228, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1964).
"'Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, § 23, 48 Star. 189.
7' Act of Sept. 28, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-721, 76 Stat. 667.
GS 12 U.S.C. § 36(c)(1) (1964).
so 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (2) (1964). The phrase "statute law" includes the legislative enactments only
and not administrative interpretations of those enactments. Union Say. Bank of Patchogue v. Saxon, 335
F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
60 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1964). An exception to the requirements is made for certain seasonal branch
operations for areas where no bank is located.
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The Supreme Court has only recently ruled on the precise application of the
first clause, namely the limitation on branches within the city, town, or village within
which the branching bank is located. The case, First National Bank of Logan v.
Walker Bank & Trust Co.,6 involved the contention of the Comptroller of the
Currency and the branching national bank that a national bank could branch in its
home community if a state bank could under any conditions maintain a branch there
notwithstanding that the national bank did not meet the conditions specified in the
state statute. 2 In rejecting the Comptroller's argument, the Court relied heavily
on legislative history and reaffirmed the statutory policy of "competitive equality."03
The Court also dealt in dictum with the second clause of section 36(c) governing
"outside" branching, concluding that the principle of competitive equality was again
intended to operate.
The law on branching has thus been an important battleground in the federal-state
conflict over banking policy.63" The Walker Bank & Trust Co. case appears to have
put to an end the Comptroller's effort to circumvent state branching restrictions in
the interest of freer banking, a goal that many deem desirable but that state
legislatures have been slow to adopt. 4 One continues to expect the future of dual
banking to be determined in large measure in the branching struggle. By this
decision, however, the Supreme Court may have removed the branching controversy
from judicial and administrative forums to the political arena. O
C. The Bank Holding Company Act
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956"6 contains a number of provisions
01385 U.S. 252 (1966). 2 1d. at 261.
0n the subject of hometown branching, the Court said the following:
"The bill originated in the House and, in substance, proposed that both national and state banks be
permitted to establish 'inside' branches within the municipality of their main banking facilities in
those States that permitted branch banking at the time of the enactment of the bill. H.R. Rep.
No. 83, 69 th Cong., Ist Sess. 4-5 (1926). The intent of the Congress to leave the question of
the desirability of branch banking up to the States is indicated by the fact that the Senate struck
from the House bill the time limitation, thus permitting a subsequent change in state law to have
a corresponding effect on the authority of national banks to engage in branching. The Senate
Report concluded that the Act should permit 'national banks to have branches in those cities where
State banks are allowed to have them under State laws.' S. Rep. No. 473, 69 th Cong., ist Sess., 14
(1926). In the subsequent Conference Committee, the Senate position was adopted."
Id. at 258.
68. For useful background, see Comment, Federalism in Interpretation of Branch Banking Legislation,
32 U. CH. L. Rv. 148 (1964).
6" Former Comptroller James J. Saxon attempted during his tenure from 196z to x966 an overt attack
on what he regarded as antiquated state banking laws. See Bratter, Fresh Air in the Comptroller's Oflce,
BANICNG, July x962, at 45, 13o, quoting Saxon as follows: "Admittedly we are putting on the pressure
all over the country. It is no accident; it is deliberate and calculated. We hope that the states will pick
up the ball ...." See also text accompanying notes 93-100 infra.
et About the only open question would appear to be the ability of state banking officials to enforce
state policies against national banks. See Comment, Banks and Banking: Authority of State Banking
Superintendent to Challenge Branching Activities of National Banks, 1967 Duxa L.J. 72, discussed note
43 supra.
60 12 U.S.C.A. §5 z841-49 (Supp. 1966). See generally Note, Federal-State Relations Under the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956, 66 YALE L.J. 1093 (1957).
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calculated to preserve the position of the states in bank regulation. A rule of comity
requires the Board of Governors, upon receiving an application for approval of an
acquisition under the act, to notify the "supervisory authority of the interested State,
if the applicant company or any bank the voting shares or assets of which are sought
to be acquired is a State bank."6 If the state supervisory authority disapproves the
application then the Board must hold a hearing before granting or denying the
application."8 Another provision of the act (the so-called Douglas Amendment)
adopts the policy of the state on out-of-state acquisitions of additional banks within
the state, whether affected through purchase of stock or of "substantially all of the
assets.""9  Such acquisitions must be "specifically authorized by the statute laws of
the State in which such bank is located, by language to that effect and not merely by
implication."70 Finally, in a sweeping abdication of authority to the states the act
provides, "The enactment by the Congress of this chapter shall not be construed as
preventing any State from exercising such powers and jurisdiction which it now has
or may hereafter have with respect to banks, bank holding companies, and sub-
sidiaries thereof."7 1 In upholding an Illinois statute the state's supreme court said
with respect to this provision:
The Illinois legislation, as well as legislation in New York, New Jersey, Pennsyl-
vania and Indiana, is an acceptance of the suggestion implied in the Federal act
that the States should act if, as a matter of policy, bank holding company legislation
more restrictive than the Federal act, was desired by the States. Further, it seems
clear that such State legislation could be applicable to national as well as State banks,
since the Congress did not manifest an intent to pre-empt the legislative field.7 2
Similarly, a judicial advisory opinion has been given by another state court that a
state multiple banking law applicable to national banks doing business within a state
would not be invalid "unless it were found to interfere with the purposes of the
national banks or to destroy their efficiency or to be in direct conflict with some
paramount federal law."73 These views seem fully consistent with the overriding
congressional policy of preserving the competitive equilibrium between national
and state banks.
V
ENCIRCLEMENT OF THE STATEs
Although the preceding sections show that the position of the state has been
17 2 U.S.C. § 18 4 2(b) (1964).
08 1d.
OD 12 U.S.C.A. § 18 4 2(d) (Supp. 1966).
70 1d.
71 12 U.S.C. § 1846 (1964).
7' Bracburn Securities Corp. v. Smith, 15 IlM. 2d 55, 61-62, 153 N.E.2d 8o6, 8o (1958), appeal dis-
missed for want of a substantial federal question, 359 U.S. 311 (1959).
" Opinion of the Justices, 151 A.2d 236, 239, 1o N.H. io6, io (1959).
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preserved in banking regulation, it is also true that there have been some develop-
ments in the opposite direciton. Federalism is, in the case of banking regulation, a
Janus, with one face looking toward adoption of state policy while the other looks
toward encirclement of the state banking systems by uniform national policy. On
account of the peculiar historical development of the dual banking system the
encirclement is limited. Moreover, it is not purposeful; it is an incidental effect of
national policies. It has, nevertheless, some significant dimensions.
It has already been noted that eclipse of the state banking system was part of
Chase's plan. The taxation of state-bank notes removed the state banks from the
currency issue function. This in itself was a considerable encirclement of the state
banking system, but was not fatal to it because of the rise of deposit banking.
No further step toward encirclement occurred until the Federal Reserve System
was established. The advantages of membership have led most of the large state
banks to choose to be members. Today approximately forty-five per cent of the
banks (all of the approximately 4,500 national banks and about i,5oo state banks) of
the nation, holding eighty-four per cent of commercial-bank deposits, are members
of the System. This brings five-sixths of deposit banking under the rules and juris-
diction of the Federal Reserve.
The state member banks are allowed to retain charter rights as state banks, but
they have become subject additionally to the Federal Reserve's authority in the same
way that national banks are. They are examined annually by the System, and each
must make reports to the Federal Reserve Bank of which it is a member. A state
bank can be expelled from membership, its officers and directors removed for con-
tinued violation of law or unsound banking practices, and its discount privileges
reduced or suspended. It is subject to additional substantive regulation. As a con-
dition of membership it may have to give up some of its charter rights. Of major
importance are larger reserve requirements and more rigid loan restrictions than
may exist under the state jurisdiction to which they are subject. They must clear
checks forwarded to them at par. They are subject to miscellaneous other require-
ments with respect to such matters as underwriting operations of its personnel,
granting of acceptance credit, acceptance of drafts above fifty per cent of their
capital and surplus, maintenance of capital stock and surplus deemed by the Board
of Governors to be adequate, and rate of interest on time and savings deposits. Also,
the law provides that all member banks, during an emergency declared by the Presi-
dent, shall transact business under such regulations as may be issued by the Secretary
of the Treasury with the approval of the President.O4
The Federal Deposit Insurance Act also brought state banks under national
jurisdiction-albeit, again, through their choice. Nonmember insured banks are sub-
ject to national rule making, e.g., the authority of FDIC to set their rates of interest
z2 U.S.C. § 95 (x964).
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on time and savings deposits. They are subject to examination and reporting require-
ments of the FDIC. About ninety-eight per cent of the commercial banks of the
nation, with about ninety-nine per cent of the deposits, are insured under the act.
While insurance of state bank deposits up to $i5,ooo has helped insure the survival of
dual banking,"5 it has done so by subjecting virtually all banks to a single jurisdiction
on requirements for bank safety.:"
In the case of the Federal Reserve and the FDIC, the benefits offered to state banks
lead to the acceptance of national jurisdiction. In some other cases national policy is
compulsory. The bank-closing order of the President in 1933 applied to all banks.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 gave the Federal Reserve Board authority to
prescribe regulations on the amount of credit for stock purchases that are applicable
to all banks. 77  Although states are allowed to adopt stricter standards on bank
holding companies, the Bank Holding Company Act of i956 establishes unified
national supervision of all bank holding companies and national approval of holding
company acquisitions.78 The bank merger legislation of 196o and 1966 applies to all
insured banks and places responsibility for administration in the three national
supervisory agencies,79 and, in addition, all banks are subject to the Sherman Act and
the Clayton Act. 0
It is clear that the independent status of the state banking systems has been
greatly compromised by national policy that either invites or compels subjection to
national jurisdiction. The states do not have equality of position in banking regula-
tion. It is obvious, also, that the existence or lack of uniformity in bank supervision,
always affected by the existence of a dual banking system, is now primarily dependent
upon the degree of coordination among national agenciess l
Whether national policy will further enlarge the national role and correspondingly
reduce the state role in banking regulation may be dependent upon a number of
factors. Since the national government has already taken steps to preserve solvency
for most banks, it may be that considerations of soundness in bank operations will
not materially change the balances between national and state authority or affect the
dual banking system. A change in the relative strength of competing interests with
respect to bank structure such as to result in a national policy on branching and other
forms of multiunit banking would reduce the position of the states and set in
motion a new chain of effects on dual banking. Similarly, the requirements for
7 See p. 758 supra.
- "It is a strange quirk of history that in 1933 Congress rather inadvertently adopted a measure
[deposit insurance] to save a dual banking system that so few thought in need of salvation; and that,
by adopting this measure, it paved the way for a 'unified national system' of banking that it was not
even striving for." Kent, Dual Banking Between the Two World Wars, in BANKING AND MONETARY
STUDIS 43, 6i (D. Carson ed. 1963).
7 15 U.S.C. § 78(g) (1964).
Is 12 U.S.C.A. 19 841-49 (Supp. 1966).
70 12 U.S.C.A. § 1828(c) (Supp. 1966).
so1 5 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964); 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (x964).
81 See generally Wille, supra note 34.
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effective monetary policy could alter the balances between national and state super.
vision. Arguments have, of course, been advanced pro and con on whether stabiliza-
tion policy and bank supervision should be pursued separately s2 The issue has been
considered with respect to valuation of bank assets, but it can arise on other matters.
Any state authorizations, requirements, or limitations on state banks that impede
national stabilization efforts, or any state banking operations that have that effect,
may be swept aside by national policy applied uniformly to all banks.
VI
CURRENT ARGUMENTS ABOUT TE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM
As is generally true in arguments about federalistic arrangements for accom-
plishing a particular governmental function, the arguments on dual banking reflect
views both about government in general and about the the particular function, and
behind these various views are the interests of groups. There are no organized groups
attacking the dual banking system, but it is defended strongly by certain organizations.
The chief of these is the National Association of Supervisors of State Banks, the
Independent Bankers Association, and the American Bankers Association. Notably,
the last of these celebrated in 1963 the one hundredth anniversary of the dual bank-
ing system rather than the centennial of the establishment of the national banking
system!
The primary argument in favor of the system of dual banking is that it provides
flexibility in service of the banking needs of the communities of the nation. The
argument has recently been stated by an advisory committee reporting to the New
York Superintendent of Banks: s3
The dual system fosters innovation by permitting either the state or the Federal
governments to experiment with and to develop new approaches to satisfying the
banking needs of the public. In a single system, either all state or all federal,
innovation and a sensitive response to the changing banking needs of the economy
would have been much more difficult.
The committee said that both the state and national systems had contributed innova-
tions that made for progress in banking, but cited particularly state introduction of
branching, loans on real estate, and fiduciary operations."4
A banker's argument in favor of dual banking is that it prevents overburdensome
control. Checks and balances among control agencies-between national and state
and among national authorities-preserves a check for the banker against govern-
"' See the replies from the FDIC, state bank supervisors, the Council of Economic Advisers, Federal
Reserve Bank Presidents, and the Chairman of the Board of Governors to a question on the role of bank
supervision. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. oN TaH ECONOMIC REPORT, 82D CONG., 2D SESS,, MONETARY POLICY
AND MANAGEMENT OF THE PUBLIC DEBT pt. I, at 401-02, pt. II, at 953, 967-73, 875, 703-04 (omm.
Print 1952).
83Naw Yom ADvisoRY COMM ITTEEa, FiasT REPORT 2.
"Id. at 2-3.
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ment. A resolution of the American Bankers Association in 1962 included this:
"The checks and balances which are inherent in the dual banking system have served
as a deterrent to inappropriate or unduly burdensome actions on either the State
or National level." 5 Similarly, the New York superintendent's advisory committee
recently said, "[T]he dual system imposes upon those responsible for law-making and
supervision an attitude of reasonableness and flexibility in the regulation of banks, an
attitude that a monolithic system would be less likely to foster."8" The basis of these
checks and balances is, of course, the freedom of banks to convert from one system to
another. Counsel for the Independent Bankers Association has testified that this
freedom means that the two levels (national and state) will be cautious about over-
regulating 87
It is argued that diffusion of political power conforms with the traditions of this
country and that in economic matters there is greater safety in decisions by many
rather than by a few. 8 Also, the diffusion of regulatory power in the national govern-
ment is seen to be related to this diffusion between national and state authorities.
A member of the Board of Governors has argued that an advantage of the present
system of divided jurisdiction at the national level is that it shields states' rights,
safeguards the autonomous spheres of national and state regulation, and supports the
checks-and-balances principle embedded in the Constitution. 9 The New York ad-
visory committee called the dual banking system "a species of Federalism, with its
attributes of checks and balances and the diffusion of governmental power which has
served this country well in preserving the freedom, and in encouraging the initiative
and the independence, of its citizens."9
The reverse of these several arguments could be found in numerous statements
expressing concern about looseness, conflicting standards, and lack of coordination
in bank supervision.' The "competition in laxity" resulting from competing juris-
dictions has often been cited. Usually this has been attributed to the loosening of
national standards to meet lower standards in some of the states, though recently
leadership in "liberalization" of standards has come from the Comptroller's office.
The competition in laxity is still seen to be a danger, and the difficulties in coopera-
tion and the time spent in liaison and coordination are lamented. 2  As for the
arguments on checks and balances, those who question the divided jurisdiction which
sr Hearings on Conflict of Federal and State Banking Laws Before the House Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1963) (proposal quoted by S. E. Babington, President of the
Independent Bankers Association) [hereinafter cited as 1963 Hearings].
" Naw YoRx ADvisoRY COMITTEE, FIRST REPORT 3.
z 1963 Hearings 7-8 (statement of Horace R. Hansen).
I88 d. at 5-6 (statement of Horace R. Hansen).
"Hearings, supra note 35, at 182 (statement of Abbot L. Mills, Jr.).
'o NEw YoR ADVISORY CosasrrrEE, FIRST REPORT 3-
" See, e.g., Robertson, Federal Regulation of Banking: A Plea for Unification, in this symposium,
p. 673.
"
5 Although he was not arguing against dual banking, Chairman Martin commented on time devoted
to liaison, cooperation, and negotiation in present bank supervision, in Hearings, supra note 35, at 6o6-07.
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exists would assert (i) the superior constitutional power of the national government
and (2) the inappropriateness of using the checks-and-balances thesis as an argument
for preserving conflicting administrative jurisdictions and the option of regulated
companies to choose the jurisdictions to which they will be subject.
The crucial issue today, in the opinion of the Independent Bankers Association
(IBA) and of former Comptroller Saxon, is that of location of decision making on
multiunit banking. 3 Saxon stated his view as follows:
The branching powers of national banks should, in my judgment, not be limited
according to those policies which the individual states find appropriate to meet
their local needs through state-chartered banks. By the same token, I believe that
the state supervisory agencies should be granted the final authority to approve
branching by state-chartered banks, whether or not they are members of the Federal
Reserve System.94
On this issue the IBA states, "It is our conviction that the people in each State must
have the ultimate right to decide what kind of banking system is best for them.""
Both IBA and Saxon stress the values of competition. The former fears the effect
of multiunit banking on "independent" banking, whereas Saxon believes that in
certain markets economies of scale better serve the needs of the public. Saxon also
points out that many bank services are not dependent on bank size"0 and contends
that therefore unit banks will remain competitive. The standard proposed by Saxon
would require unit banks to compete without a shelter for inefficiency."7 The IBA
claims that it too believes in competition among banks. On the other hand, it has
been said that Saxon advances a new concept of competition between systems.
8s
The two do argue different concepts of dual banking. Both accept dual charter-
ing and banker option on jurisdiction. The IBA argues, in addition, for a dual
banking system characterized by national adoption of state policy. Saxon argues,
in contrast, that "the only sense in which the duality of a banking system can be
made truly meaningful is to regard the authority of each segment as separate and
distinct, and not subordinate one to the other." 9
Saxon recognizes that the independence of the two systems of bank supervision
is weakened by national supervision, as well as by national adoption of or deferral to
state policy. His answer is, "I believe, further, that the state supervisory agencies
98 Mr. Saxon's retirement as Comptroller may, of course, mark an end of the controversy, but this
seems unlikely even if Saxon's successor follows more conservative policies. The issues having been raised,
they will not be allowed to disappear until the critics of the present system are satisfied. See, e.g., Krcps,
Modernizing Bank Regulation, in this symposium, p. 648.
"Address before the National Ass'n of Supervisors of State Banks, Bretton Woods, N.H., Sept. S,
x962.
95 x963 Hearings 3 (statement of S. E. Babington).
9 d. at 371-75.
"'Id. at 278.
" Id. at 99 (statement of Randolph Hughes, Chairman, Legislative Committee, National Association of
Supervisors of State Banks).
"' Address, supra note 94.
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should be encouraged to build adequately-compensated staffs to the point that they
may be relied upon to assume full res2onsibility for the examination and super-
vision of state-chartered banks."'100 Those who oppose Saxon are not likely to believe
that strengthening of state supervision would eliminate FDIC and Federal Reserve
supervision and thus reproduce the independence of the state systems that existed
prior to the passage or the acts creating these authorities.
CONCLUSIONS
History, not logic, explains the existence of the dual banking system. It
was not planned. It arose because of a change in banking opportunities not foreseen
by policy makers in 1863. It survived because both supervisory jurisdictions responded
to the pressures for increased banking facilities. It remains because national policies
have been adjusted to the existence of state banks. National policy supports the
system by making optional membership in the Federal Reserve System, deference
to state policy on branching and in other areas, and the inclusion of state banks in the
deposit insurance system.
The system of dual banking that exists is a many-faceted system. It includes
dual chartering and separate supervision by chartering jurisdictions, but also features
overlapping of the two systems by national adoption for national banks of state
policies, on the one hand, and national attraction of state banks into national super-
visory systems, on the other. It is the total set of arrangements that determines the
nature of the system.
Several general lessons on federalism can be seen in the development of the system.
The chances of history affect the allocation of functions between national and state
governments. Policy is built incrementally on existing system. Exercise of dele-
gated powers is checked by the strength or weakness of going systems and the
interests served by them. The attributes of federalism are determined far less by
legalism and principle than by the course of events affecting the performance of a
particular function. These attributes will vary function by function and will, both
for separate functions and for federalism as a whole, put unplanned and unmatched
patches on a multipatterned coat.
Federalism in banking is not constitutional federalism but legislative and admin-
istrative federalism resulting from the nonuse of national powers. Its pattern in
the future, if it survives, will depend on two things: first, the results of the continuing
contest over multiunit versus independent banking; and, second, the extent to which
unity in monetary and credit policy is impeded by lack of unity in the banking
system. The first of these will determine the survival of the national policy of
deferring to state policy choices; the second will dictate the degree of national
encirclement of the state regulatory functions.
100 d.

